2027: Why Tinubu’s Supporters Believe Kwankwaso May Not Stop APC From Winning Kano, North

2027: Why Tinubu’s Supporters Believe Kwankwaso May Not Stop APC From Winning Kano, North
By Akin Alade
For months, one of the dominant arguments surrounding Nigeria’s 2027 presidential election has been that President Bola Ahmed Tinubu faces an uphill battle in the North, particularly in Kano State, where former governor Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso commands a formidable grassroots political following.
That calculation has become even more significant following the political partnership between Peter Obi and Kwankwaso, with Obi emerging as the presidential candidate of the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC) and Kwankwaso as his running mate. The alliance has already been identified as potentially consequential in the North-West.
But supporters of President Tinubu and the ruling All Progressives Congress are increasingly challenging the assumption that Kano automatically belongs to Kwankwaso in 2027.
The latest and perhaps one of the most significant voices is House of Representatives member Abdulmumin Jibrin, who represents Kiru/Bebeji Federal Constituency in Kano State.
Jibrin declared during an interview on Channels Television’s Politics Today that he believes Tinubu will defeat Kwankwaso in Kano in the 2027 presidential election.
Coming from a politician who previously worked closely with Kwankwaso and understands the internal structure of the Kwankwasiyya movement, the prediction has added another dimension to the emerging battle for Nigeria’s most politically important region.
Why Kano Matters So Much in 2027
Kano is not just another state on Nigeria’s electoral map.
Its enormous voting population makes it one of the biggest prizes in any presidential contest, while the wider North-West remains a crucial electoral battleground. Recent political analysis has consequently described the region as perhaps Nigeria’s most strategic battleground ahead of 2027.
The importance of Kano was demonstrated dramatically in 2023.
Kwankwaso contested the presidential election as the NNPP candidate and overwhelmingly won Kano State, demonstrating the strength of his political organisation and personal following.
That performance is one reason many analysts believe Tinubu could struggle to penetrate Kano substantially in 2027.
But APC strategists believe the political environment has changed.
Jibrin’s Argument: 2027 Is Not 2023
Perhaps the most important argument advanced by Jibrin is that Kwankwaso’s position on the ballot has changed.
In 2023, Kwankwaso was the presidential candidate.
In 2027, he is running alongside Peter Obi as the vice-presidential candidate of the NDC.
For Jibrin, that distinction matters enormously.
A Kano voter who supported Kwankwaso when he personally sought the presidency may not necessarily transfer that vote automatically to another presidential candidate simply because Kwankwaso is his running mate.
That is one of the fundamental assumptions behind APC’s optimism.
The 2027 question therefore becomes: How transferable is Kwankwaso’s political support?
If virtually all his supporters accept his instruction to back Obi, the NDC ticket could remain extremely formidable in Kano.
But if a significant percentage distinguishes between voting for Kwankwaso as president and voting for Obi with Kwankwaso as deputy, the electoral arithmetic could change considerably.
Jibrin has publicly argued that this difference gives Tinubu an opportunity to turn the tables.
Kwankwasiyya Is No Longer Politically Untouched
Another factor APC supporters are relying upon is the changing structure of Kano politics.
Kwankwaso remains one of the state’s most influential politicians, but the political organisation surrounding him has experienced defections and realignments.
An earlier analysis by The Guardian noted that defections and counter-defections involving figures associated with the Kwankwasiyya movement had opened Kano and the wider North-West to increasingly intense political competition.
That matters because elections are rarely won by popularity alone.
Political structures, lawmakers, local government networks, grassroots organisers, influential community figures and election-day mobilisation all play important roles.
The APC appears to be working on the calculation that peeling influential politicians away from Kwankwaso’s political network could gradually reduce the dominance he demonstrated in 2023.
APC Is Strengthening Its Kano Structure
Tinubu’s supporters also point to recent political movements into the APC.
President Tinubu recently welcomed Senators Rufai Hanga and Kabiru Gaya to the ruling party, part of the continuing political realignment ahead of 2027.
Individual defections do not automatically translate into votes, of course.
A politician can defect without bringing his entire support base.
But when several influential politicians move in one direction, the cumulative effect can strengthen organisation, expand grassroots networks and provide additional campaign machinery.
This appears to form an important part of APC’s Kano strategy.
Rather than attempting to defeat Kwankwaso’s influence with one political heavyweight, the party may seek to build a broad coalition capable of challenging him across constituencies.
Tinubu Does Not Necessarily Need to Sweep Kano
There is another important point sometimes overlooked in discussions about Kano.
Tinubu does not necessarily need to reproduce Kwankwaso’s 2023 performance and completely dominate the state.
From a national electoral strategy perspective, substantially improving APC’s vote while preventing the opposition from recording an overwhelming margin could itself be politically valuable.
Presidential elections are decided nationally.
Therefore, reducing a rival’s advantage in one of his strongest territories can sometimes be almost as important as winning overwhelmingly there.
That may explain why APC’s northern strategy is likely to focus not only on winning states but also on preventing Obi and Kwankwaso from accumulating commanding margins across the North-West.
Obi-Kwankwaso Alliance Remains a Serious Threat
None of this means APC has an easy road ahead.
Underestimating Kwankwaso in Kano would be politically dangerous.
His Kwankwasiyya movement has demonstrated significant grassroots strength, and his performance in 2023 provides measurable evidence of his electoral influence.
The Obi-Kwankwaso partnership could also bring together two different political constituencies.
Obi enters the contest with the nationwide political movement that supported his 2023 presidential campaign, while Kwankwaso contributes a powerful northern political network, particularly in Kano and parts of the North-West.
Analysts have consequently argued that their alliance could reshape the 2027 contest in the region.
That combination explains why Kano is likely to become one of the most intensely contested states in the presidential election.
Tinubu’s Incumbency Could Matter
Unlike in 2023, Tinubu enters the forthcoming election as an incumbent president.
That brings advantages and liabilities.
His administration will be judged on economic conditions, security, infrastructure, agriculture, employment and the general cost of living.
Opposition parties will inevitably attempt to turn economic hardship into an electoral referendum on the administration.
Tinubu’s supporters, however, will campaign on his government’s reforms, infrastructure projects and other achievements while arguing that difficult economic decisions are beginning to produce longer-term results.
Indeed, current commentary around the election increasingly frames 2027 partly as a referendum on Tinubu’s first term.
How northern voters assess that record could ultimately prove more decisive than political endorsements.
The North Is Becoming a Competitive Battlefield
Perhaps the biggest mistake any political camp could make is assuming the North belongs automatically to one candidate.
Northern Nigeria is not politically homogeneous.
Kano has its peculiar dynamics. Kaduna has another. Katsina, Jigawa, Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara and other states each contain different political structures, personalities and local considerations.
APC strategists appear determined to ensure that the narrative of inevitable northern rejection of Tinubu does not become accepted as political fact before voting even begins.
Jibrin’s declaration should therefore be understood within that larger battle for political perception.
Elections are fought not only at polling units but also through narratives.
If voters repeatedly hear that a candidate cannot win a particular region, that perception can influence politicians, donors, campaign workers and undecided voters.
Tinubu’s supporters are attempting to dismantle that narrative early.
Why Jibrin’s Prediction Cannot Be Ignored
Jibrin’s statement is politically interesting because he is not analysing Kwankwaso entirely from outside.
As a former political ally, he understands the strengths and potential weaknesses of the movement he is now preparing to confront.
That does not mean his prediction will automatically prove correct.
He is now an APC politician supporting Tinubu, and his declaration should therefore be treated as a partisan forecast rather than an established electoral outcome.
But it nevertheless provides insight into APC’s emerging thinking.
The ruling party appears to believe that Kwankwaso’s support is not completely transferable to Obi, defections have altered Kano’s political structure, incumbency gives Tinubu additional leverage, and a stronger APC coalition can substantially improve on the party’s 2023 performance.
Kano May Hold One of the Keys to 2027
The battle for Kano is therefore shaping up to become much more complicated than a straightforward Tinubu-versus-Kwankwaso contest.
It could become a test of political structures against personal loyalty.
A test of incumbency against opposition mobilisation.
And perhaps most importantly, a test of whether the millions who previously supported Kwankwaso as a presidential candidate are prepared to follow him when he campaigns for Peter Obi.
That question cannot be answered confidently until the votes are counted.
For now, Kwankwaso remains a formidable force in Kano, while the Obi-Kwankwaso ticket presents a genuine challenge to APC’s ambitions in the North-West.
But the reverse argument is becoming increasingly clear.
Tinubu’s supporters are no longer prepared to concede Kano—or the wider North—to the opposition before the election begins.
Jibrin’s prediction is therefore less about declaring an election already won than announcing that APC intends to fight aggressively for territory many analysts previously considered Kwankwaso’s political fortress.
If Tinubu succeeds in breaking that fortress, even without completely dominating Kano, the consequences could significantly reshape the arithmetic of Nigeria’s 2027 presidential election.

